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Recent experiences of many countries during the crisis restored the important dilemma
that ﬁscal policymakers face of how to alleviate the demand contraction while ensuring
sustainability of public ﬁnances in the long-term.
In this paper we study the consequences of the demand and supply shocks for Poland under
alternative policy scenarios. Using a macroeconometric model of the Polish economy, we
analyse the response of the economy to shocks under several ﬁscal policy rules. We try to
answer the questions which ﬁscal rule works best in terms of public ﬁnance sustainability
and business cycle ﬂuctuations stabilization while taking into account the source of shocks
to the economy.
We found that structural balance rule and expenditure rule act counter-cyclically in the
whole simulation period, but at the same time the pace at which they stabilize public debt
is quite slow.
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Recent experiences of the crisis restored the important dilemma that ﬁscal policymakers face
of how to alleviate the demand contraction while ensuring sustainability of public ﬁnances in
the longer term. As the crisis aggravated, countries all over the world introduced ﬁscal impulses
into the economy during 2008-2009 period. That has led to the sharp increase in ﬁscal deﬁcits
and public debt both in advanced as well as developing countries (OECD, 2009).
In light of the above, the notion of ﬁscal rules reappeared. Fiscal rules are institutional mech-
anisms aimed at supporting ﬁscal credibility and discipline. Essential goal of a ﬁscal rule is
to promote debt sustainability. However, apart from being credible, ﬁscal rule should also be
suﬃciently ﬂexible in response to shocks hitting the economy. The situation in Poland during
the crisis might be treated as an example of how automatic stabilizers cushioned the global
shock. Owed to them, economic slowdown in Poland probably was not that severe as it could
be otherwise. Moreover, perfect timing of the ﬁscal stimulus contributed signiﬁcantly to better
than in other European countries economic situation in Poland (see e.g. OECD, 2010). Thus,
important aspect of a ﬁscal rule is its ﬂexibility to respond to shocks aﬀecting the economy.
In the spirit of the discussion above, in this paper we analyse alternative ﬁscal policy rules
in terms of both their eﬀectiveness in restoring sustainable public debt position as well as their
ability to cushion several shocks aﬀecting the economy. We consider four ﬁscal policy rules:
simple balance rule, structural balance rule, augmented growth-based balance rule and expen-
diture rule. The behaviour of these rules is analysed under four scenarios in which diﬀerent
shocks aﬀect Polish economy. We consider a boom-bust scenario, interest rates shock scenario,
positive price shock scenario and positive productivity shock scenario (a supply shock scenario).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces. In section 2 we brieﬂy present ﬁs-
cal stance in Poland after recent crisis and argue that there is a huge need of designing new
ﬁscal policy rules. In this context, in section 3 we discuss so far introduced ﬁscal rules in Poland.
Section 4 discusses properties of alternative ﬁscal policy rules and refers to simulation conclu-
sions of the analysis conducted by the IMF (2009). In section 5 we introduce ﬁscal policy rules
that we simulate in the econometric model of the Polish economy developed within the Ministry
of Finance (eMPF model). Section 6 presents results of our simulations and section 7 concludes.
12 Fiscal policy rules in the current crisis context – the case of
Poland
Although Poland is the only country among OECD members that recorded positive GDP growth
in 2009, economic activity has weakened considerably and GDP growth decelerated from 6.0%
on average in 2006-2008 to 1.8% in 2009. As ﬁrst symptoms of economic slowdown in Poland
at the end of 2008 occurred, the country’s authorities started to stabilize the economy with the
magnitude of an implemented anti-crisis plan of about 0.7% of GDP in 2009 as measured in
terms of changes in the structural balance (according to OECD, 2010). In 2008 general govern-
ment deﬁcit widened to 3.7% of GDP (from 1.9% of GDP in 2007), breaching the Maastricht
Treaty reference value of 3% GDP. It was caused by cyclical factors, i.e. decreasing public
revenues together with increasing expenditure as GDP growth weakened. In 2009 general gov-
ernment deﬁcit expanded towards 7.1% of GDP with public debt amounting to 51.0% of GDP.
It resulted both from cyclical deterioration of the economic activity as well as structural reforms
(among others lowering the tax wedge started in 2007 and continued in 2009 as well as chil-
dren allowance). In July 2009 the ECOFIN Council imposed the Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure
on Poland with the recommendation that the country corrects its general government deﬁcit by
lowering its value to below 3% of GDP by the end of 2012.
Figure 1a may serve as an illustration of the ﬁscal situation in Poland depending on the business
cycle phase. On this graph the change in the primary cyclically adjusted government balance
versus the output gap is presented. As is visible from this graph, in 2008 we observed pro-cyclical
relaxation in Poland. In 2009 the situation changed and there was counter-cyclical relaxation
in the country. Both Polish experts as well as international institutions have agreed that the
timing of the ﬁscal stimulus in Poland was an important factor that supported Poland during
the crisis (see e.g. OECD, 2010). On average, during 2008-2009 ﬁscal policy in Poland turned
to pro-cyclical relaxation meaning that adverse developments of 2008 (from the budget deﬁcit
point of view) prevailed. On Figure 1b Poland’s situation in this context is illustrated together
with the situation in other EU countries. While ﬁscal policy in Poland in 2008-2009 was pro-
cyclically relaxed, ﬁscal policy loosening was counter-cyclical on average in the European Union
and euro area. However, the relaxation in Poland at that time was less pro-cyclical than in the
Czech Republic, Cyprus and Slovenia, and signiﬁcantly less pro-cyclical than in Greece, Slovakia
and Romania.
It is apparent that ﬁscal policy was used as a stabilization instrument during the crisis. As
crisis is ending, an important ”exit strategy” question emerges in all countries touched by the
crisis. Main challenge for ﬁscal policy is to develop credible strategies for strengthening pub-
lic ﬁnances. To be stable, the recovery should be followed by consistent improvement of the
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ness of alternative ﬁscal policy rules. One conﬁrmation of this are ongoing discussions within
the European Commission concerning strengthening the institutional framework of ﬁscal policy.
Fiscal rules are institutional mechanisms aimed at supporting ﬁscal credibility and discipline.
Essential goal of the ﬁscal rules is to promote debt sustainability. As Wyplosz (2005) remarks,
the diﬃculty here is that, as opposed to the monetary policy for instance, ﬁscal discipline objec-
tive is not as clear-cut. It is due to the fact that government respects its intertemporal budget
constraint, which by deﬁnition refers to (possibly inﬁnitely) long horizon. A rule has to be cred-
ible in order to put the debt back on the sustainable path, but it should also have adequate
ﬂexibility in responding to shocks. As rules are aimed at long-term ﬁscal discipline, short-term
goal of stabilizing business cycle is ignored, implying the risk that ﬁscal policy becomes pro-
cyclical (Wyplosz, 2005). The IMF (2009) also mentions the ”suﬃcient ﬂexibility to respond to
shocks” as one of the three dimensions of eﬀectiveness of the ﬁscal policy rules. Simulation anal-
ysis of the IMF (2009) shows that cyclically balanced rules are superior in dealing with output
shocks, but at the same time cyclical adjustment is needed. In the short run, ﬁscal policy may
also make a contribution to output stabilization over the business cycle.
However, in transition from crisis to normalcy, the speciﬁc circumstances of a country should
be taken into account while designing appropriate ﬁscal rule. In countries that need substantial
ﬁscal consolidation, realistic consolidation plan should precede the implementation of the rule.
As the IMF notice, early implementation of the rule in a highly uncertain after-the-crisis en-
vironment may be infeasible in terms of the real economy adjustment needed (IMF, 2009). In
addition, working on the ﬁscal rule the cyclical position of the economy should be taken into
account.
3 Fiscal rules in Poland
As the EU member state, Poland is committed to comply with the Stability and Growth Pact
(henceforth SGP) meaning that excessive (i.e. more than 3% of GDP) general government deﬁcit
is to be avoided and the public debt-to-GDP ratio should not surpass 60% of GDP.
The only one formal ﬁscal rule in Poland, introduced in the constitution, is consistent with
SGP debt criterion. In addition, there are two intermediate debt thresholds at 50% and 55%
deﬁned in the Public Finance Act to prevent the 60% ratio from being breached. According
to this act, if the public debt exceeds 50% of GDP in year t, the state budget deﬁcit for the
following year t+2 cannot be larger as a share of total revenues than in the current year t+1. If
public debt exceeds 55% in year t, among others the following steps are switched on. The state
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that the debt to GDP ratio will not exceed the level reached in year t. Moreover, wages in the
public sector are frozen starting with year t+2 and indexation of pensions is limited to inﬂation
in the current year t + 1. There are also restraints on the level of deﬁcit for the sub-national
governments, with allowed increases in expenditure mainly resulting from the co-ﬁnancing of
EU related projects. Finally, if the public debt breaches 60% of GDP, the government has to
submit to Parliament an economic programme to lower the debt to GDP ratio to below 60%.
In addition, all automatic consolidation measures at the central government level at above the
55% threshold apply, but also the proposed local budgets have to be balanced for the next year
t + 2 and public ﬁnance entities cannot issue new guarantees.
In response to deteriorating public ﬁnance situation due to crisis, in January 2010 the govern-
ment published a development and public ﬁnance consolidation plan which heralds introduction
of the two ﬁscal rules. First one, temporary, would aim at reduction of the structural deﬁcit to
1% of GDP (i.e. to the medium term objective level - MTO). It would be based on limiting real
expenditure growth of the central government to 1% annually. However, as it applies only to
expenditure that is ”not determined by already enacted laws”, it will eﬀectively cover only up
to 15% of general government sector expenditure. Second rule, of more permanent character,
would stabilize the structural deﬁcit at the MTO level. It is meant to be counter-cyclical and
refers to the average GDP growth in several years. The plan also states that an additional
mechanism reducing public expenditure below 40% GDP may also be needed.
4 Properties of alternative ﬁscal rules
In this section properties of alternative ﬁscal policy rules against several economic policy ob-
jectives are discussed. The so far theoretically discussed ﬁscal rules will then be considered in
the context of model simulations in section 5 and 6.
There are essentially four general kind of rules (IMF, 2009):
• Budget balance rules that target either overall balance, structural balance, cyclically ad-
justed balance, or balance ”over the cycle”; they help ensure that the debt-to-GDP ratio
converges to the ﬁnite level
• Debt rules targeting the public debt in percent of GDP
• Expenditure rules setting the limits on total, primary or current spending. As they usually
do not constrain the revenue side at the same time, they might lead to widening deﬁcit
and debt
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collection and/or preventing an excessive tax burden. As they usually do not constrain
the spending side at the same time, they might lead to widening deﬁcit and debt.
Of the abovementioned ﬁscal rules, two of them render the risk of pro-cyclicality by deﬁnition:
budget balance rule and debt rule. As automatic stabilizers are stronger on the revenue side,
also revenue rules tend to result in pro-cyclical ﬁscal policy. It means that these rules might
prove less eﬀective in terms of stabilizing business cycle ﬂuctuations. A cyclically adjusted and
structural balance rule allow automatic stabilizers to operate in full, though there is no leeway
for discretionary ﬁscal stimulus. Expenditure rules are consistent with cyclical and discretionary
reductions in tax revenues, but they do not normally permit discretionary expenditure stimulus
(IMF, 2009).
The IMF (2009) simulates behaviour of several ﬁscal rules under alternative macroeconomic
scenarios. In a baseline scenario considered by the IMF GDP growth of 4.0% in the simula-
tion period is assumed. The alternative scenarios taken into account are large shock scenario
which assumes that GDP growth declines in period T +1 to -3.0% from 4.0% in T, low growth
scenario in which GDP growth declines to 3.0% in period T + 1 and the boom-bust scenario.
Three alternative cyclically adjusted balance rules are considered: a basic structural balance, an
augmented growth-based and an augmented structural balance rule (for details see IMF, 2009).
As authors of the analysis conclude, all rules considered allow for progressive narrowing of
the budget deﬁcit after the initial shock according to the large growth shock scenario. Basic
structural balance rule outperforms other rules in terms of letting automatic stabilizers oper-
ate during the periods in which there is a non-zero output gap. However, it is less eﬀective in
reducing public debt. More successful in providing ﬁscal policy correction (and also debt sus-
tainability) are the augmented structural balance and augmented growth-based balance rules.
However, it is at the cost of a more limited counter-cyclical response to the shock (stronger
for the augmented structural balance rule). The authors stress that simulations highlight the
trade-oﬀ between macroeconomic volatility and debt sustainability (see IMF, 2009).
In the low-growth scenario, the augmented growth-based balance rule ensures debt consoli-
dation. This rule leads to fastest reduction in debt as overall balance is tightened both as a
result of a return of the output growth to trend growth and operation of a deﬁcit-convergence
mechanism. In the low-growth scenario considered, basic structural balance rule could lead to
explosive debt-to-GDP ratio as it allows automatic stabilizers to expand. This can be amended
with structural balance rules by requiring the deﬁcit to eventually converge to zero but this
process is slow.
In the boom-bust scenario, augmented structural balance rule works better. Under this sce-
nario, all rules considered reduce the ﬂuctuations in ﬁscal balance compared to basic structural
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increasingly deviates from potential. In the long run however, all rules induce a surplus in the
primary balance and consequently, the debt ratio would follow a downward path following the
bust period (IMF, 2009).
The abovementioned analysis of the IMF experts was an inspiration for us to simulate the
behaviour of the Polish economy in response to several shocks under alternative ﬁscal policy
rules. As our simulations are run within the macroeconometric model of the Polish economy,
we are able to take into account the feedbacks between economy and ﬁscal policy. Our analysis
seems to be diﬀerent from that of the IMF’s in that they use exogenous paths for macroeconomic
variables (such as GDP growth and output gap) and in our case all variables are determined
within the system.
5 Rules to be simulated within the model of the Polish economy
The performance of various ﬁscal rules in the Polish economy will be analysed within the struc-
tural macroeconometric model developed in the Polish Ministry of Finance (the eMPF model
– for description see Dudek et al., 2010). eMPF is a medium-scale quarterly econometric model
of the Polish economy. It consists of 250 equations, of which 50 are stochastic. The supply side
is modelled in accordance with the classical paradigm and in the short-run the adjustments are
in place. Behavioural equations are of standard error correction mechanism form which enables
short-run deviations from a long-run equilibrium to be corrected. As it is developed within the
Ministry of Finance, it contains detailed general government sector block. However, there are
no ﬁscal policy rules built in so far.
Alternative ﬁscal rules will be confronted both in terms of their ability to stabilize public debt-
to-GDP ratio as well as their ﬂexibility in responsiveness to diﬀerent macroeconomic shocks.
The following shocks will be considered: a boom-bust world economy development, interest rate
increase, positive price shock and positive shock to productivity. In this context, alternative
ﬁscal policy rules will be analysed, namely the balance rule, the structural balance rule, the
augmented growth-based balance rule and the expenditure rule.
The balance rule assumes that the budget balance in a given year is equal to the medium-
term balance target. The rule may be simply written as follows:
bt = b∗, (1)
where bt means budget balance in a given year and b∗ – medium-term balance target (medium-
term target of -1% GDP is assumed).
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balance is adjusting towards medium-term balance target corrected for a cyclical position of an
economy (measured with the output gap). It may be written as:
bt = b∗ + agapt, a > 0, (2)
where gapt means output gap (as a percentage of a potential GDP) in a given year and a stands
for semi-elasticity of the balance in response to the output gap. We assume that semi-elasticity
in response to the output gap equals 0.5.
The augmented growth-based balance rule is similar to the structural balance rule, but the
medium-term budget balance is adjusted for the diﬀerence between actual and long-term (trend)
GDP growth instead of changes in the output gap. We may write this rule as:




t ) + c(bt−1 − b∗), a > 0.5,0 < c < 1, (3)
where g
y
t stands for actual GDP growth in a period t, g
y∗
t is trend GDP growth (the average
GDP growth of the last ﬁve years is taken as a target) and measures the speed of adjustment
when nominal budget balance departs from the medium-term target. We assume 0.1 elasticity
of the budget balance in response to the budget balance gap and 0.5 elasticity in response to
the GDP growth gap.
The expenditure rule sets limit for public expenditures according to the cyclically adjusted
public revenues. This rule may be written as follows:
expt = revt/(1 + gapt), (4)
where expt is expenditure ceiling in the budget, revt is the actual revenue and gapt is the output
gap in period t.
In all simulations the budget deﬁcit target of 1% GDP is assumed. The simulations are run
in a way that main adjustment category is public sector wage. At the same time constant ratio
of public sector investments to compensation in this sector is assumed, so that in practice also
public investments are adjusting in response to shocks. We assumed quarterly adjustment in
response to shocks what is due to numerical optimization procedures.
6 Empirical results
The behaviour of the abovementioned rules is simulated under four alternative macroeconomic
scenarios in the eleven-year period (44 quarters). The simulation results are presented in a com-
parison to the baseline scenarios. There are altogether four baseline scenarios - one for each
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diﬀerent paths for macroeconomic variables in each baseline scenario. As a point of departure,
the economy in the model was put on the path that ensures 1% of GDP budget deﬁcit. Thus,
the characteristics of the economy introduced into the model in a point of departure are far
from actual situation in Poland. This was done in order to let the rules switch on and operate
according to their properties, so that the responses of the rules to various macroeconomic shocks
could be analysed.
In the boom-bust scenario (S1) a 4% real GDP growth during four consecutive years is assumed,
6% decline in the next three years, and stagnation afterwards. Under the supply shock scenario
(S2) it is assumed that quarterly productivity growth doubles in the ﬁrst year of the simula-
tion period (an impulse shock), meaning that it reaches around 5% growth annually. Another
scenario (S3) tests the responses of the ﬁscal rules to a 1 pp. interest rate increase shock in all
periods (a sustained shock). Scenario S4 assumes that deﬂator of the value added in a market
sector goes up by 3% in the ﬁrst quarter of the simulation period (an impulse shock). Table 1
below summarizes these scenarios assumptions.
Table 1. Scenarios assumptions
Source: own compilation
As discussed above, the aim of our analysis is to present the response of the Polish economy to
shocks under alternative ﬁscal policy rules. Eﬀectiveness of the rules will be analysed both in
terms of their ability to stabilize public debt to GDP ratio as well as their counter-cyclicality.
The assessment will be done more in qualitative than quantitive terms, on the basis of the
impulse response functions. In respect to the ﬁrst criterion, as public debt stabilizes for all rules
considered (see further this section), the pace of debt convergence to the baseline after a shock
is taken into account. Counter-cycylicality condition (our second assessment criterion) is deﬁned
in a way that it is met if government sector balance improves when percentage deviation of the
output gap from the baseline is positive and deteriorates when this deviation is negative.
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under each scenario. The responses of relevant variables are presented as a deviation from the
baseline scenario either in percentage of the baseline or in percentage points, depending on how
a speciﬁc variable is expressed. The results are presented on Figures 2 to 6 at the end of the
paper. Our scenarios results are discussed in more detail below.
Scenario 1
Under the boom-bust development of the world economy (S1), Polish GDP varies accordingly
in the whole simulation period. The boom period leads to reduction of the share of the public
sector in the economy, resulting in lower public revenues and expenditures as well as public
debt in relation to GDP. As expenditures fall by more than revenues (in relation to GDP), it
results in ﬁscal policy contraction and ﬁscal deﬁcit reduction with all the rules acting, apart
from the simple balance rule. As a consequence, GDP growth slows down. In the recession
phase of the cycle, these tendencies are reversed.
Although all the rules apart from the simple balance rule act counter-cyclically (government
sector balance improves when percentage deviation of the output gap from the baseline is pos-
itive and deteriorates as this deviation is negative), at the ending part of the simulation period
the augmented growth-based balance rule starts acting pro-cyclically. All the rules behave very
similarly in terms of stabilizing public debt, but simple balance rule stabilizes this category
most quickly (however at the expense of lower business cycle stability) (see Figure 2).
Scenario 2
Under positive shock to productivity (scenario S2), potential GDP growth is higher than in the
baseline scenario. The consequence of initial misalignment of real versus potential GDP growth
is ﬁscal policy relaxation and government deﬁcit widening in the ﬁrst part of the simulation
period under the operation of all the rules.
All rules are eﬀective in terms of business cycle stabilization (they act counter-cyclically),
although shortly after the initial impulse the augmented growth-based balance rule becomes
slightly pro-cyclical what is a result of this rule deﬁned in reference to the average GDP growth
in ﬁve years. Similarly to other rules it is also counter-cyclical in the reminder simulation pe-
riod. All rules stabilize public debt, although simple balance rule and augmented growth-based
balance rule lead to debt-to-GDP ratio stabilization at only slightly higher level than in the
baseline (see Figure 3).
Scenario 3
Under interest rate shock (scenario S3) government expenditures are growing in the whole sim-
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balance deteriorates (with respect to the baseline scenario) only just after introduction of the
shock. Since then, the balance signiﬁcantly improves (most rapidly in case of augmented growth-
based rule) as a result of the operation of the rules.
Again, structural balance rule and expenditure rule both act counter-cyclically in the whole
period considered. At the very end of the simulation period the augmented growth-based bal-
ance rule turns out to be pro-cyclical. All rules lead to stabilizing public debt-to-GDP ratio,
however the pace of adjustment is diﬀerent depending on the rules. Simple balance rule and
augmented growth-based balance rule both stabilize public debt much more rapidly than other
two rules (see Figure 4).
Scenario 4
Under positive price shock (scenario S4), inﬂationary loop works towards higher price growth
as compared with the initial impulse at the beginning part of the simulation period, leading
to a decline in domestic and external demand. As a result, real GDP growth falls in the ﬁrst
part of the simulation period in comparison with the baseline scenario. GDP and output gap
contraction make ﬁscal rules acting. After the initial impulse export is feeding on the real de-
preciation of the exchange rate resulting in GDP growth.
Structural balance rule and expenditure rule both act counter-cyclically in the whole period
considered. At the very end of the simulation period the augmented growth-based balance rule
turned out to be pro-cyclical. Simple balance rule proves the least eﬀective in terms of business
cycle stabilization, but at the same time it is able to stabilize public debt most quickly (see
Figure 5).
As debt stabilization is one of the two criteria of comparison for the rules, in addition to
the above observations, we also extend the simulation sample by twenty years (80 quarters) to
better illustrate long-run behavior of the public debt after the shocks. On Figure 6 we present
debt to GDP ratio altoghether for the four rules considered under our simulation scenarios.
From the graph it is visible that debt-to-GDP-ratio stabilizes under all scenarios at around
26-33%, depending on a rule and scenario. This is a result of our assumptions concerning world
demand and medium-term budget target.
Table 2 below summarizes the properties of diﬀerent types of ﬁscal rules considered under
all scenarios against our two assessment criteria (rules objectives). From this table the apparent
trade-oﬀ between the pace of debt stabilization and business cycle ﬂuctuations alleviation is
visible. Rules stabilizing debt more quickly are worse in terms of macroeconomic shocks sup-
10pression (and vice versa).
Table 2. Properties of alternative ﬁscal rules in all scenarios against two objectives
Source: own compilation
7 Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to analyse alternative ﬁscal policy rules in terms of both their ef-
fectiveness in restoring the sustainable debt level as well as their ability to cushion several
shocks aﬀecting the economy. Simulations of the four ﬁscal rules under alternative macroeco-
nomic scenarios were conducted within the macroeconometric model of the Polish economy. The
behaviour of ﬁscal rules was compared in each scenario with the baseline scenario. In general,
our simulations show that there is virtually no diﬀerence in operation of the structural balance
and expenditure rule. Our results reveal the trade-oﬀ between ﬁscal consolidation and business
cycle ﬂuctuations alleviation. This was also found by the International Monetary Fund experts
(IMF, 2009).
We found that structural balance rule and expenditure rule act counter-cyclically in the whole
simulation period, but at the same time the pace at which they stabilize public debt is relatively
slow. It should be kept in mind though, that we assume the constant level of budget balance
target, so it does not take into account the long-term GDP growth. As we could expect, the
simple balance rule proves the least eﬀective in terms of business cycle stabilization, but at the
same time under operation of this rule public debt-to-GDP ratio stabilizes most rapidly. How-
ever, it should be kept in mind that results presented here are dependant on the assumptions
made, especially in terms of the parameters of rules introduced into the model.
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